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ABSTRACT: Timely disclosure of financial statement information is a critical requirement for 
firms and well-functioning capital markets. Yet, every quarter or year, a non-trivial number of 
firms are late in filing their financial statements. This paper identifies and probes various capital 
market consequences for late filings of quarterly and annual financial statements. It examines the 
short- and long-window reaction to late filings, as well as how equity investors process 
statements accompanying late filing announcements, such as managers declaring intentions to 
file within/outside SEC’s allowed grace periods. The paper documents that delayed quarterly 
filings have distinctly different valuation implications than delayed annual filings over the short 
and long run, and that accounting problems play a unique role in signaling the seriousness of the 
delay. It also shows that investors do not accept managements’ delay-related assertions at face 
value, and that delayed filing announcements signal continued poor performance that is not fully 
reflected in stock prices at the time the announcements are made. One particularly surprising 
finding is that stock prices drop significantly as soon as firms signal late statement filings via the 
regulatory form, even when management declares it will meet the extended deadline. Overall, 
this paper sheds new light on important capital market consequences of filing financial 
statements late. 
 
Keywords: asset pricing; accounting problems; SEC filings; financial statements; market 
efficiency. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Timely disclosure of financial statement information is a critical requirement for firms and well-
functioning capital markets. Late filings delay financial disclosures that help investors make 
informed investment decisions; therefore, late filings increase information asymmetry and thus 
trading costs (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom 1985). Late filings may also trigger regulatory penalties 
and covenant violations that impose large costs on shareholders. 
Companies that fail to file a 10-Q or 10-K on a timely basis are required by U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 12b-25 to file a Form NT (for “Non-Timely”) 
no later than one day after the due date. Timely filing of Form NT (also known as Form 12b-25) 
results in an automatic one-time grace period of five days for 10-Qs and 15 days for 10-Ks. Form 
NT also requires management to provide a narrative explanation of the reason for the late filing 
and declare whether it expects to subsequently file within the allowed grace period. Companies 
that file Form NT on a timely basis and subsequently file within the allowed grace period are 
considered by the SEC to have filed on a timely basis, and they thereby avoid SEC-imposed 
penalties.1 Conversely, companies that fail to file within the allowed grace period are subject to a 
variety of costly penalties, including deregistration by the SEC, delisting by stock exchanges, the 
inability to raise capital through issuance of public securities, and potential debt covenant 
violations.2 
                                                 
1  However, during the grace period, companies are not allowed to register securities that rely upon the late 
statements until they are ultimately filed. 
2 Other adverse consequences include the inability to hold an annual shareholder meeting until the 10-K is filed. We 
note, however, that the most costly penalties are typically imposed only in the most egregious cases. For example, 
SEC administrative proceedings are usually reserved for issuers who are excessively late; and stock exchange 
delisting procedures are typically not triggered until the company is at least six months late in its filing. However, 
some penalties are effectively imposed immediately upon expiration of the grace period. Specifically, companies 
who miss the grace period are not eligible to issue securities using Form S-3 (referred to as “shelf registration”) until 
they have filed in a timely manner for at least 12 months. This imposes costs by limiting a company’s ability to raise 
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The purpose of this paper is to study the capital market consequences of late filings by 
examining and contrasting the immediate and future market consequences of late 10-Q and 10-K 
filing announcements. We examine three research questions. Our first question is designed to 
document the stock price reaction to the NT filings that announce the late filing of the 10-Q or 
10-K. Based on the preceding discussion, we expect a negative market response to NT filings in 
which management declares the filing will occur beyond the grace period. It is less predictable, 
however, whether investors will respond negatively to NT filings in which management declares 
the filing will occur within the grace period. Because the SEC considers these filings to be timely, 
they impose no obvious costs on shareholders and hence may generate no market response.3 
Nevertheless, it is possible that investors may infer negative news simply from the fact that the 
firm did not meet its original filing deadline, in which case investors may react negatively. 
Further, because our sample is dominated by NTs that declare that the firm will file within the 
grace period (86 percent of our sample), if there is no reaction to the filings, we may also observe 
no response for our sample as a whole.  
The second research question asks whether investors react differently to late quarterly 
filings than to late annual filings. Shareholders may react differently to late quarterly than to late 
annual filings because quarterly financial statements require less disclosure and are unaudited. 
However, it is not clear whether the reaction to late quarterly filings is smaller or larger than the 
reaction to late annual filings. On one hand, less disclosure in quarterly financial statements may 
lead to a smaller reaction to NT 10-Qs than to NT 10-Ks because less information is being 
                                                                                                                                                             
capital on a timely basis (Smith et al. 2013). Covenant violations are also a potential cost that would be immediately 
incurred. 
3 We acknowledge, however, that late filings, even when filed within the grace period, extend the duration of the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. However, because the grace period only extends the 
duration by five to 15 days, we do not expect such delays to be very costly. 
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withheld from the market. On the other hand, because quarterly filings are much less onerous to 
produce than annual filings, late quarterly filings may signal more serious underlying problems 
than late annual filings, suggesting a stronger negative reaction to NT 10-Qs than to NT 10-Ks. 
The third research question asks whether the immediate market reaction around the NT 
filing is complete and whether its completeness is a function of the reason for the delay. Given 
that late filings are relatively rare events and may occur for a variety of unusual reasons, market 
participants may have difficulty interpreting their valuation consequences on a timely basis and 
may be better at interpreting the consequences of some reasons better than others.  
We perform our analysis on a sample of 2,115 first-time late filers. We begin by first 
documenting several regularities that are new to the literature. Specifically, we document that 
accounting problems are the most frequently cited reason for filing delays. Furthermore, the 
average delay for both 10-Qs and 10-Ks is more than three times longer when accounting 
reasons are cited (41 days) than when corporate events (such as employee turnover) explain the 
delay (13 days) or when managers provide reasons that are uncertain (11 days). Finally, we find 
that management is more than twice as likely to miss the grace period deadline for late 10-Qs (51 
percent of the time) than for late 10-Ks (25 percent of the time).  
We address the first research question by examining short-window stock price changes 
around the NT filing dates. Our analysis of the entire sample finds a significantly negative stock 
price reaction to both NT 10-Q filings (–2.93 percent) and NT 10-K filings (–1.96 percent). Our 
analysis of the subsample of NT filers that declare their intentions to ultimately file within the 
grace period also finds a significantly negative stock price reaction. We also find a significantly 
larger negative reaction to NT filers that subsequently failed to file within the grace period when 
compared to firms that meet the deadline. Critically, we find this result regardless of whether the 
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NT filing includes management’s declared intention to subsequently file within the grace period. 
This explains why investors respond negatively even to the subset of late filers declaring they 
will file within the grace period and suggests that investors are able to “see through” 
management assertions that turn out to be false. We further find evidence suggesting that when 
accounting reasons are cited for the delay, investors infer that quarterly filings signal deeper 
underlying problems that ultimately prevent management from meeting the grace period 
deadline. Overall, the results from answering our first question suggest that investors do not take 
managements’ announcements at face value and instead appear to use other information to infer 
the accuracy of managements’ announcements.  
In answer to our second research question, we find a significantly larger negative reaction 
to filing an NT 10-Q (i.e., filing the form indicating a late 10-Q) than to filing an NT 10-K (i.e., 
filing the form indicating a late 10-K). In addition, we find that firms reporting accounting 
reasons for the delay drive the larger negative reaction to the NT 10-Q filings. This indicates that 
accounting problems that prevent timely 10-Q filings are perceived as more costly than 
accounting problems that delay 10-Ks, perhaps because they are unaudited and less burdensome 
to prepare (e.g., require significantly less disclosure). 
In answer to our third question, we investigate whether the immediate stock market 
response is complete by examining stock price changes during the year following the NT filings. 
We find that, on average, abnormal returns for both NT 10-Q and NT 10-K filers continue to 
drift downward during the post-filing months. However, this drift is less pronounced when 
accounting reasons underlie the delay, suggesting that investors are better able to interpret the 
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valuation implications of accounting-related late filings.4 In addition, we find that return on 
assets (ROA) is significantly negative for late 10-K and 10-Q filers during the NT filing period 
as well as during the following two quarters. Together, these findings are consistent with the 
negative market response to the NT announcements being at least partially due to the NT filings 
conveying information about deeper problems, including poor future operating performance, and 
not simply due to the firm missing an SEC filing deadline. 
This paper contributes to the capital markets literature regarding the consequences of 
untimely quarterly and annual financial reporting, as well as the stock market’s interpretation of 
management communications. Our first contribution lies in the finding that market participants 
do not naively accept management’s declarations included in late filing announcements. In 
particular, investors are generally able to predict which firms will miss the filing deadline within 
the SEC’s allowed grace period, irrespective of management’s stated intentions. Our finding that 
investors are able to “see through” management’s incorrect assertions suggests that investors in 
this setting are relatively sophisticated in mapping financial information into stock prices. 
Accordingly, our analyses have implications for late filers because they question the wisdom of 
management’s disclosing incorrectly the expected filing date of Form 10-Q/K.  
A second contribution is that this paper adds to the prior literature that examines late 
filings. With the exception of Griffin (2003), prior research examines annual filings (e.g., Alford 
et al. 1994; Dee et al. 2010; Impink et al. 2012). We add to this literature by investigating and 
contrasting both the long- and short-window market reaction to 10-K and 10-Q NT filings. 
Specifically, we examine how equity investors process different statements provided by 
managers when they file late, the unique role played by accounting problems in signaling the 
                                                 
4 For completeness, we also examine the stock market reaction to the subsequent actual filling of the late 10-Ks and 
10-Qs. This analysis finds a significant negative market reaction to the subsequent filings, consistent with an 
incomplete reaction during the NT filing event window. 
6 
 
seriousness of the delay, and the post-announcement returns. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
institutional background and prior research. Section 3 discusses the data and variables used in the 
paper. Section 4 outlines our tests and reports the results. Section 5 summarizes the findings and 
states our conclusions. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
Financial Statement Filing Requirements 
In 1946, the SEC first began requiring annual Form 10-K to be filed within 90 calendar 
days after year end. In 1970, the SEC began requiring quarterly Form 10-Q to be filed within 45 
calendar days after quarter end. In April 2002, in response to calls to shorten the deadlines, the 
SEC issued a proposal to reduce the filing deadlines for the largest public companies to 35 days 
for 10-Qs and 60 days for 10-Ks.5 The SEC argued that modern technology allows companies to 
file timelier periodic reports and that market participants currently demand timelier information. 
The final rule (as amended) reduces the 10-Q filing deadline from 45 days to 40 days for both 
“accelerated” filers (with public float greater than $75 million and less than $700 million) and 
“large accelerated” filers (with public float greater than $700 million); the final rule also reduces 
the 10-K filing deadline from 90 days to 75 days for accelerated filers and to 60 days for large 
accelerated filers.6 “Non-accelerated” filers (with public float less than $75 million) experience 
                                                 
5 SEC Release No. 33-8089 (April 12, 2002). Former SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen is quoted as saying, “…because 
companies need not file the [quarterly] report until 45 days after the end of the quarter, the information is often 
stale” (Brown 1985). 
6 The new rules are codified in SEC Release No. 33-8128 (September 5, 2002), as modified in SEC Release Nos. 
33-8507 (November 17, 2004) and 33-8644 (December 27, 2005). Also, we note that the SEC refers to the “public 
float,” defined as the market value of voting and nonvoting common equity held by non-affiliates (e.g., SEC 2005; 
Impink et al. 2012), that is, the part of equity that is not held by management or large shareholders. However, there 
is legal uncertainty regarding the definition of an “affiliate” and hence the definition of a firm’s public float (e.g., 
Iliev 2010). We validate our use of market value of equity in our filing status classification procedure by calculating 
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no change in either 10-Q or 10-K deadlines.  
 
Implications of Late Financial Statement Filings for Shareholder Value 
Late filing of Forms 10-Q and 10-K delays disclosures that help investors make informed 
investment decisions, and it increases trading costs due to increased information asymmetry. In 
addition, there are possible legal consequences to violating the SEC’s 10-Q and 10-K filing 
deadlines, some of which are severe (Hartlin 2008). 7  For example, the SEC can revoke 
companies’ registration under the SEC Acts, and late filers may be delisted by their national 
stock exchange. Indeed, in the two years after the late filing announcement, 16.2 percent of our 
sample firms stopped trading on their stock exchanges for reasons other than mergers, as 
opposed to only 6.9 percent in the Compustat universe. Late filers also are prevented from 
issuing securities using the short-form shelf registration statement (Form S-3) for the next year.8 
Other possible adverse consequences include debt covenant violations and the inability to hold 
an annual shareholder meeting until the 10-K is filed. In addition, untimely filing may signal 
underlying problems that impose costs on shareholders, such as issues related to accounting and 
corporate events. Thus, there are several reasons why filing Form NT may be associated with a 
negative stock price reaction. 
If a company is unable to file its 10-Q or 10-K on time, it is required to file a Form NT 
                                                                                                                                                             
Pearson and Spearman correlations between a firm’s current filing status in Audit Analytics, when available, and our 
classification. We find that both these correlations are positive, high, and significant, at the 1 percent level. Given 
that historical market values change over time relative to current market values, which determine the current filing 
status, our findings provide reasonable assurance about the filing status classification procedure. We also note that 
our use of total market capitalization is consistent with the literature (e.g., Impink et al. 2012, who use total market 
classification to classify their sample firms). 
7 The SEC requirement to file annual and quarterly reports originates in Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act and 
the rules promulgated there-under (see Rule 13a-1 and Rule 13a-13). 
8 Late filing also prevents a company from using Form S-8 for employee benefit plans and from selling restricted 
securities under Rule 144, at least until the issuer has remedied the late filing (Hartlin 2008). 
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(also known as Form 12b-25) no later than one day after the original due date of the 10-Q or 10-
K. Timely filing of Form NT results in a one-time grace period (or extension of time) of five 
days for 10-Qs and 15 days for 10-Ks. Although Rule 12b-25 states that extensions are granted 
only when a firm filing on time would incur “unreasonable effort or expense,” the SEC does not 
formally decide whether the reasons for the late filing provided in Form NT are justifiable 
(Morse et al. 2009). Rather, if the form is complete and filed in a timely manner, the extension is 
effectively treated as “automatic.” Part II of Form NT requires registrants to explicitly declare 
whether they expect to file within the respective grace period by checking a box, and Part III of 
Form NT requires management to explain why the filing is delayed. If the late 10-Q or 10-K is 
then filed within the grace period, it is considered by the SEC to be filed in a timely manner, and 
no penalties are imposed.9 This suggests that late filings that are ultimately made within the 
SEC’s grace period may be benign events that do not result in a negative stock price reaction.10  
The frequency of late filings has fluctuated over time in response to a variety of changes 
in the financial reporting environment. For example, late filings increased after regulators 
shortened the filing deadlines during 2004 through 2007, as well as after the increased 
disclosures required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) (Durfee 2004; Taub and Cook 
2005; Aguilar 2007; Impink et al. 2012).11 Other factors that are likely to adversely impact 
timely reporting are the increased frequency of restatements and the adoption of complex new 
accounting standards, such as the expensing of stock options. Thus, as financial market 
regulation evolves over time and financial reporting requirements become more complex, the 
                                                 
9 The one exception is that the company is not allowed to issue securities that are predicated on the timely filing of 
the reports until the late reports are actually filed. 
10 For an example of Form 12b-25 see, https://www.sec.gov/files/form12b-25%2C0.pdf. 
11 Ettredge et al. (2006) also present evidence of audit delays as a result of SOX Section 404; and Ettredge et al. 
(2000) report the effect of quarterly reviews on the timing of adjustments in quarterly earnings reports. 
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incidence of late filings is likely to continue to fluctuate. 
 
Prior Research 
Alford et al. (1994) examine abnormal stock returns for a sample of Form NT filers but 
do not investigate the short-window reaction to NT 10-K filings, nor do they distinguish between 
filings that occur within or beyond the SEC grace period. This is because the objective of Alford 
et al. (1994) is to “document how frequently firms either extend or violate the 10-K filing 
requirements, and to describe the financial characteristics of these firms.” They analyze stock 
returns in order to describe the financial characteristics of 10-K NT filers and to assess whether 
they are in financial distress. The primary conclusion in Alford et al. (1994) is that 20 percent of 
the 10-Ks filed during their sample period are late and that the majority of late filers is 
financially distressed. 
Although Alford et al. (1994) do not examine the short-window reaction to NT 10-K 
filings, one of their analyses adds tension to the current paper. Specifically, one of the stock price 
holding periods they examine begins one day after the 10-K due date and ends on the day the late 
10-K is actually filed. They refer to this as the “delay period” (see their Table 5, Panel C). This 
analysis has implications for the current paper because the NT due date is one day after the 10-K 
is due, which falls within this delay period. Somewhat surprisingly to those authors, Alford et al. 
(1994) find an insignificant market reaction for all but the firms that are late by more than 17 
days. This is surprising because it is consistent with market participants not reacting negatively 
to any of the NT 10-K filings in their paper.12 However, the absence of a market reaction to NT 
filings around the filing date may be due to several reasons not considered by Alford et al. (1994): 
                                                 
12 Specifically, Alford et al. (1994, Table 2) show that the number of NT filers that file within 17 days (131 + 1,420 
divided by the total number of NT filers with 10-K filing information, 2,518) equals 62 percent. 
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The NT filings may inform investors that the ensuing 10-K late filing will be within the SEC 
grace period; market participants may anticipate the information contained in the NT (in which 
case the information contained in Form NT is already incorporated in price); and the open-ended 
nature of the information reported in the NT may be difficult for shareholders to calibrate, in 
which case the reaction may be incomplete around the NT filing. 
In a more recent paper, Impink et al. (2012) examine whether the provisions in SOX 
resulted in increased delays in 10-K filings. They find that although the provisions in SOX did 
not lead to increased delays, firms with SOX Section 404 weaknesses were more likely to file 
late 10-Ks. Impink et al. (2012) differ from the current paper by restricting their analysis to NT 
10-Ks and issues related to the effects of SOX-related delays. By comparison, the current paper 
examines a different set of research questions and a wider range of phenomena. In particular, we 
investigate and contrast the stock market reaction to late quarterly and annual financial statement 
filings, examine issues regarding management’s declared intention to file within the SEC grace 
period, investigate post-announcement stock price returns, and examine the post-NT operating 
performance of firms that file late.13 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA 
Variable Definitions 
As in Alford et al. (1994), we calculate the filing delay, DelayDays, as the number of 
calendar days between the estimated statutory deadline and the actual 10-Q or 10-K filing date, 
                                                 
13 In other recent studies, Cao et al. (2010) investigate the market reaction to a subset of NT filings that are mainly 
due to information system failures; Gao et al. (2011) examine the market reaction to a subset of NT filings to 
investigate how bondholder activists respond to late filings; and Wang et al. (2013) examine the impact of non-
timely filings on audit fees. We note that that 10-Qs and 10-Ks can include disclosures related to untimely 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD)—a less researched aspect of the general issue of untimely required SEC filings. 
Relatedly, Griffin et al. (2011) find that FD levies three kinds of enforcement and disclosure costs. In addition, a 
somewhat related study addresses late releases of preliminary earnings (Duarte-Silva et al. 2013), although it is 
distinct from late filings of 10-Q/K. 
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i.e., DelayDays = filing date minus the statutory filing deadline. To obtain the statutory filing 
deadline, we program an algorithm that calculates DeadlineDays, i.e., the number of days 
between fiscal quarter/year end and the filing deadline. To find the filing deadline, we use the 
SEC’s filing requirements and acceleration rules that were effective during our sample period.14 
To ensure accuracy, we use a crawler program that extracts two variables directly from SEC’s 
Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) database in calculating DelayDays: 
“Filing Date” and “Period of Report”.15 We use EDGAR’s “Period of Report” (which is the end 
of the fiscal quarter or year) because the fiscal quarter/year end in Compustat rounds the fiscal 
quarter/year end to the nearest month. 
We measure buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the n trading days for firm i as:  
Πt=1,n(1 + Ri,t) – Πt=1,n(1 + E(Ri,t)),       (1) 
where: Π is the product operator; Ri,t is firm i’s daily return on day t, inclusive of dividends and 
other distributions; and E(Ri,t) is firm i’s expected return on day t. We adjust stock returns for the 
effect of delisting following the two-step procedure in Konchitchki (2011), as used in Beaver et 
al. (2007) and Balakrishnan et al. (2010).16 
                                                 
14 Specifically, we first classify observations as non-accelerated, accelerated, or large accelerated filers, using the 
market value of equity based on the last business day of the issuer’s most recently completed second fiscal quarter. 
Next, the algorithm uses the following deadline dates after the fiscal year or quarter end: (a) for fiscal years ending 
before December 15, 2003, all filers must file the 10-K within 90 days and the 10-Q within 45 days; (b) all 
accelerated filers (both large accelerated and accelerated) with fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2003, 
must file the 10-K within 75 days, with no change to the 10-Q; (c) all accelerated filers (both types) with fiscal years 
ending on or after December 15, 2004, must file the 10-Q within 40 days; and (d) all large accelerated filers with 
fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2006, must file the 10-K within 60 days. If the deadline date falls on a 
non-business day, the algorithm uses the first following business day as the deadline day. See also 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8128.htm and http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8644.pdf. 
15  See, e.g., http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312510241317/0001193125-10-241317-
index.htm. 
16 In the first step, if a security delists during the return accumulation window and the reason for the delisting return 
is coded by CRSP as a mostly poor-performance-related reason (delisting codes equal to 500 or between 520 and 
584, e.g., bankruptcy or insolvency), we correct for the delisting bias identified in Shumway (1997) by using as the 
delisting return a single replacement value of –100 percent (see also Sloan 1996). In the second step, the raw return 
is the delisting return if the raw return is missing, or the compounded raw return with the delisting return if the raw 
return is not missing. Overall, the portion of the delisting firm-daily observations is very small (0.08 percent), and 
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To measure expected returns, we use the three Fama and French (1993) factors, MKTRF, 
SMB, and HML, augmented by a momentum factor, UMD, following Carhart (1997). Following 
prior research (e.g., Konchitchki 2011, 2013), we first estimate the following model using a 40-
trading-day hold-out period, which begins 55 trading days prior to the NT filing date: 
Ri,t – Rf,t = αi + βMKTRF,i·MKTRFt + βSMB,i·SMBt + βHML,i·HMLt + βUMD,i·UMDt + εi,t,    (2) 
where: Ri,t is firm i’s daily return on day t, inclusive of dividends and other distributions; Rf,t is 
the one-month Treasury bill daily return on day t; and MKTRF, SMB, HML, and UMD are the 
Fama-French and momentum daily factors returns, where MKTRFt is the daily excess return on a 
value-weighted aggregate equity market portfolio, SMBt is the return on a zero-investment factor 
mimicking portfolio for size (market value of equity), HMLt is the return on a zero-investment 
factor mimicking portfolio for book-to-market value of equity, and UMDt is the return on a zero-
investment factor mimicking portfolio for momentum factor. We then use firm i’s estimated 
betas from equation (1) to compute the expected return for firm i on day t, as follows: 
.    (3) 
Data 
We obtain our sample of NT filers from the Audit Analytics Non-Timely Module Feed 
(NT) dataset for all 10-Q and 10-K late filings with fiscal period-ends between 2000 and 2008, 
where the NT filing date is on or prior to September 1, 2009. We require return data through 
2010. Our sample period begins in 2000 because the coverage by Audit Analytics, the source of 
the initial sample, begins in 2000. We obtain accounting data from the quarterly and annual 
Compustat databases. 
                                                                                                                                                             
inferences from the returns tests throughout the paper are unchanged when we replicate our analysis after excluding 
delisting returns. For more information on related event studies see, e.g., Konchitchki and O’Leary (2011); DeFond 
et al. (2013).  
           , , , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )i t f t MKTRF i t SMB i t HML i t UMD i tE R R MKTRF SMB HML UMD
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Because Alford et al. (1994) found that two-thirds of their sample includes late filers that 
fail to file the required Form NT, we also attempted to identify the non-NT late filers during our 
sample period. Using the filing dates in the Compustat database, we identified several thousand 
firms that appeared to be non-NT late filers. However, when we compared a sample of 100 filing 
dates in the Compustat database to the actual filing dates reported on the Form 10-Ks in the 
EDGAR database, we found that the filing dates in the Compustat database are unreliable. 
Specifically, while the Compustat database indicates that a large number of firms file late 
without filing a Form NT, this is not actually the case, and these apparent non-NT filers actually 
filed on time. To further investigate this issue, we contacted Compustat personnel, who 
acknowledged that the filing dates in their database are unreliable and contain numerous errors.17 
Thus, unlike with Alford et al. (1994), there are not enough non-NT late filers during our sample 
period to merit analysis. One explanation for the larger number of non-NT filers found in Alford 
et al. (1994) when compared to our paper is that compliance has improved during our sample 
period. Another possible explanation is that the non-NT late filers in that paper consist of on-
time filers that are misclassified. Such a misclassification would explain why stock prices in 
Alford et al. (1994) do not decline during the delay period for any of the late filers that fail to file 
Form NT (in their Table 5, Panel B), although they do find that stock prices decline during some 
delay periods for the late filers that file Form NT (in their Table 5, Panel C).  
We retrieve the fiscal quarter/year end date and the actual filing date of the corresponding 
financial statements directly from the EDGAR database. We obtain the risk-free rate and the 
Fama-French and momentum factors from the Fama-French Portfolios and Factors dataset 
available through the Wharton Research Data Services. We retrieve data on stock prices, number 
                                                 
17 They also indicated they are working to resolve the problem. We also communicated with Wayne Carnall, former 
chief accountant of corporation finance at the SEC, who indicated that it is very rare for late filers not to file Form 
NT. 
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of shares outstanding, and stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
Daily Stock File. We calculate the market value of equity by multiplying the number of shares 
by the stock price, adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends, and the six-month trailing return 
by compounding each firm’s CRSP raw daily returns over the period. 
Table 1 reports our sample selection procedure. The initial sample of NT filers consists of 
49,233 observations (30,920 NT 10-Qs and 18,313 NT 10-Ks). We delete 41,932 observations 
(26,857 NT 10-Qs and 15,075 NT 10-Ks) due to missing data on Compustat, CRSP, Audit 
Analytics, or EDGAR.18 To increase the likelihood that the NT form contains news, we restrict 
our sample to first-time NT 10-Q and 10-K filings.19 This restriction further reduces the sample 
size by 4,656 observations (2,793 NT 10-Qs and 1,863 NT 10-Ks). We then eliminate 509 
observations (206 NT 10-Qs and 303 NT 10-Ks) with missing short-window abnormal returns, 
with prices lower than one dollar, or with market values of equity lower than $10 million 
because estimating abnormal stock returns of penny stocks and firms with immaterial market 
capitalization is unreliable. We next exclude 21 NT filings (16 NT 10-Qs and 5 NT 10-Ks) that 
primarily delay for technical reasons, as they are unlikely to convey news.20 This procedure 
yields a final sample of 2,115 NT filers, 1,048 NT 10-Qs and 1,067 NT 10-Ks. It is notable that, 
although 10-Qs require fewer disclosures and are unaudited, which implies there are fewer 
reasons for delay, companies also file at least as many NT 10-Qs as NT 10-Ks. 
                                                 
18 A major reason for the reduction in sample size is that Audit Analytics is comprised of not only listed firms but 
also non-listed firms such as shell companies, non-operating entities, mining companies, trust funds, and pension 
funds, which choose to register with the SEC and file audit reports. Because these entities are not listed on a stock 
exchange, they are not covered by Compustat and CRSP (see, e.g., Lennox and Li 2014 for more details). 
19 To ensure a first-time filing, we pool all NT filings during the sample period to identify first-time NT filers. If in 
the first year a firm files both NT 10-Q and 10-K, the NT 10-K filing is excluded from the sample because the NT 
10-K filing might have been anticipated and thus triggered less reaction. However, for the first sample year, 2000, 
we are unable to ascertain whether it is a first-time filing because data for 1999 is unavailable. To assess the effect 
of this limitation on our results, we replicate our tests after removing year 2000 from the sample and obtain very 
similar results. 
20 These include primarily reasons related to computer problems with the EDGAR online filing system.  
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics about our sample firms. Panel A of Table 2 shows 
that the average delay in filing is 28.61 days (labeled DelayDays), nearly identical for both 10-
Qs and 10-Ks, whereas the median delay in filing is only six days for 10-Qs and 15 days for 10-
Ks. This indicates that most late 10-Qs are filed after the five-day grace period, most 10-Ks are 
filed within the 15-day grace period, and that both distributions are positively skewed, indicating 
that some late filings, particularly 10-Qs, can be very late. The second row of Panel A reports the 
number of days from the fiscal period end to the actual filing date and indicates, not surprisingly, 
that the 10-Ks take much longer to file than the 10-Qs. The next row in Panel A shows that 87 
percent of the NT filers explicitly declare on the Form NT that they intend to subsequently file a 
10-Q or 10-K within the allowed grace period. Other statistics reported in Panel A include the 
following: 44 percent of the NT filers report losses, they average 1.7 losses out of the prior five 
quarters, average raw stock returns are –3 percent over the prior six months, average cash flows 
from operation are positive in the prior quarter, 33 percent report a sharp decline in cash flows 
during the prior quarter, average total assets are approximately $2.3 billion, 21 percent are listed 
on the NYSE, 48 percent are listed on the NASDAQ, 68 percent have Big N auditors, 53 percent 
are accelerated filers, average market value is $1.1 billion, average book-to-market is 0.75, and 
the average change in market value over the previous quarter is zero percent. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the distribution of observations by year, form type (i.e., NT 
10-Q versus NT 10-K), and delay reason. The delay reason is classified into one of four 
categories: Uncertain, Accounting, Corporate Events, and Multiple (i.e., both Accounting and 
Corporate Events reasons), based on management’s explanation of the reason for the delay 
reported in Part II of Form NT.21 The pattern of NT filers is relatively consistent with the events 
                                                 
21 We obtain the delay reason codes by interpreting the late filings reasons from the NT narratives directly from 
Audit Analytics, and we sort these reasons into four categories. For brevity, we do not include this sorting procedure 
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during that period that are likely to cause delays. For example, there is as a relatively large jump 
in NT filers from 165 in 2003 to 378 in 2004, the first year in which the shorter filing deadlines 
are phased in and the year in which SOX 404 reviews are required for the first time. Panel B also 
shows that the accounting reasons for the delays jumped from 78 in 2003 to 261 in 2004, 
consistent with the large number of restatements that followed from SOX 404 and the initial 
implementation of auditor inspections by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB). By 2007, SOX 404 procedures and PCAOB inspections had been in effect for two 
years, and the total number of NT filers declined from 233 in 2006 to 137 in 2007. 
Panel C of Table 2 reports the distribution by stock exchange and shows that the majority 
of our sample observations is from the three major national exchanges: AMEX, NYSE, and 
NASDAQ National Market. Panel D of Table 2 reports the frequency of NT filers that declare on 
the NT form that they will file within the grace period, along with the frequency with which they 
actually do so. Overall, this analysis shows that 51 percent (534/1,048) of NT 10-Q filers 
ultimately fail to file within the grace period, compared with only 25 percent (269/1,067) of NT 
10-K filers. This panel also indicates that although 86 percent (900/1,048) of the NT 10-Qs 
indicate they will subsequently file within the grace period, 50 percent (446/900) of that group 
actually fail to do so. Likewise, whereas 87 percent (933/1,067) of the NT 10-Ks indicate they 
will subsequently file within the grace period, 23 percent (218/933) of that group fail to actually 
do so. Thus, a fairly large percentage of NT filers that declare their intention to file within the 
grace period fail to do so, and the failure rate is substantially higher for NT 10-Q filers. 
Furthermore, in untabulated analysis, we find that when accounting reasons are cited for the 
delay, 59 percent of NT 10-Q filers miss the grace period deadline, compared with only 30 
                                                                                                                                                             
as well as the definition of the Audit Analytics codes, but this information is available upon request. An alternative 
approach is to use a computerized retrieval and classification approach as in Feldman et al. (2006). 
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percent of NT 10-K filers missing the grace period deadline. This is consistent with NT 10-Q 
filings signaling deeper underlying problems that lead to management missing the grace period 
deadline. In subsequent analysis we investigate the capital market consequences to firms that 
declare they will file within the grace period, but subsequently fail to do so. 
Table 3 presents the industry distribution of our sample firms using the 15 industries as in 
Barth et al. (2013) and it compares it with that of the Compustat universe. The sample firms span 
all 15 industries, representing a broad cross-section of firms. However, not all industries are 
equally represented. The Durable Goods industry is the most highly represented in our sample 
(20.0 percent of the observations), and the Food and Other industries are the least represented 
industries (1.5 and 1.3 percent of the observations, respectively). Comparing the distribution of 
the NT filers with that of the Compustat population reveals that the NT filers appear to be a fairly 
representative subset of the Compustat population, with no particular industry or subset of 
industries appearing to be over- or under-represented. 
Table 4 presents the distribution of the late filing delay in days, DelayDays, by form type, 
management’s declaration of whether it intends to file within the grace period, and the reason for 
the delay. Panel A of Table 4 reports the delay days partitioned by whether management declares 
its intention to file within the five-day grace period for 10-Qs or the 15-day grace period for 10-
Ks. As may be expected, the comparison indicates that the number of delay days is significantly 
shorter when management declares it will file within the grace period.22 Specifically, for the 10-
Qs and 10-Ks combined, the mean number of delay days is 50.97 when management does not 
indicate it intends to file within the grace period (i.e., Part2_Check = 0) and significantly less 
than half of that number, 25.17 days, when management indicates it intends to file within the 
                                                 
22 Throughout the paper we define statistical significance as p-values less than ten percent, two-tailed. 
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grace period (i.e., Part2_Check = 1). 
Table 4 also categorizes each firm’s reason for the filing delay, as noted above, into one 
of four categories: Uncertain, Accounting, Corporate Events, and Multiple (i.e., both Accounting 
and Corporate Events reasons), based on management’s explanation of the reason for the delay 
reported in Part II of Form NT. Panel B of Table 4 reports the delay days by the reason for the 
delay and shows that for the NT 10-Qs and NT 10-Ks combined, 49 percent (1,029/2,115) report 
accounting as the reason for the delay, followed by 25 percent citing uncertain reasons 
(521/2,115), 14 percent reporting corporate events (302/2,115), and 12 percent reporting multiple 
reasons (263/2,115). In addition, the average delay for 10-Qs and 10-Ks that report accounting 
reasons for the delay is 41.45 days, compared to 13.08 days for corporate events, 10.92 days for 
uncertain, and 31.26 days for multiple reasons. Thus, accounting issues are responsible for the 
majority of the delayed filings and are also responsible for substantially longer delays when 
compared to the other commonly reported reasons. 
 
TESTS AND RESULTS 
Stock Price Response to Late Filing Announcements 
Table 5, Panel A, addresses our first research question, which investigates how investors 
react to NT filings. We answer this question by examining the stock price response to NT filings 
during the five-day window around the NT filing date, [–2, +2], where day 0 is the filing day. 
The results answer this question in the affirmative by indicating that when Forms NT 10-Q and 
NT 10-K are pooled, the stock market response is significantly negative (–2.44 percent).  
Our second research question asks whether investors react differently to late quarterly 
filings than to late annual filings. Panel A of Table 5 also addresses this question; we find that 
the response to NT 10-Qs (–2.93 percent) is significantly more negative than the response to NT 
19 
 
10-Ks (–1.96 percent). The stronger negative reaction to news of late quarterly filings is 
consistent with stock market investors interpreting management’s inability to comply with Form 
10-Q filing requirements, which are significantly less onerous than Form 10-K requirements, as a 
signal of more serious underlying problems. It is also consistent with the results in Table 2, 
which find that NT 10-Q filers are nearly twice as likely as NT 10-K filers to miss the grace 
period filing deadline. The greater relative frequency of missing the grace period deadline 
suggests that NT 10-Qs signal deeper underlying problems when compared with NT 10-Ks. 
Although results with the full sample  find a significant immediate market reaction to late 
10-K filing disclosures around the NT filing date, Alford et al. (1994, Table 5, Panel C) generally 
fail to find an immediate reaction during event windows that include the NT filing due date. 
Instead, Alford et al. (1994) only find negative returns during long windows following the 
statutory due date of 17 days or more (which comprise only 38 percent of their sample).23 To 
reconcile our findings with the mixed results of Alford et al. (1994), we examine the stock 
market reaction to late filings with delay days of five days or less and six to 17 days separately 
(to correspond with the partitions used in the analysis performed in Table 5 of Alford et al. 1994). 
Unlike in Alford et al., Panel B of Table 5 reports a significantly negative stock price response in 
both subsamples for the 10-Ks as well as the 10-Qs. However, there are several reasons why our 
results may appear to differ from those reported in Alford et al. (1994). One is that during the 
sample period covered in Alford et al. (1994), firms mailed the Form NT to the SEC, which 
means that the NT filing was not publicly available during the event period examined. In our 
sample period, Form NT is filed electronically and thus becomes publicly available immediately; 
hence, we can very precisely identify when the filing information becomes publicly available.  
                                                 
23 See Alford et al. (1994) Table 2 for the number of late filers by number of days. 
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Table 5, Panel C, examines the stock price response to NT filings after partitioning the 
sample on whether management declares its intention to file the 10-Q or 10-K within the allowed 
grace period (by checking the box in Part II of Form NT). The results show that when the NT 10-
Q and NT 10-K filings are pooled, the stock market reaction is significantly negative whether 
management checks the box (Part2_Check = 1) that declares its intention to file within the grace 
period (–2.37 percent) or does not (Part2_Check = 0), thereby not declaring its intention to file 
within the grace period (–2.89 percent), and the difference between the two is not significant. 
Although the negative response in the subsample that declares its inability to file within the grace 
period may be expected, the negative response in the subsample declaring its intention to file 
within the grace period is somewhat puzzling because the SEC considers filing within the grace 
period a timely filing. One possible explanation is that investors suspect some of the firms will 
ultimately fail to file within the grace period. In answering our second research question below, 
we explore this explanation. 
When the NT 10-Q and NT 10-K are considered separately, we find that investors react 
significantly more negatively when management declares that the 10-K will not be filed within 
the grace period (–3.77 percent) compared to when management declares the 10-K will be filed 
within the grace period (–1.69 percent). The difference in market reaction between 10-Qs that 
will not be filed within the grace period (–2.09 percent) and those that will be filed within the 
grace period (–3.06) is insignificant. However, the analysis in Table 6 below considers whether 
investors further condition the reaction to management’s declaration to file within the grace 
period on whether they expect management to subsequently actually do so. 
Table 5, Panel D, investigates whether the stock market reaction to the late filing 
announcement varies with the stated reason for the delay. Thus, we further partition the sample 
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of NT filers into four subsamples based on the stated reason for the late filing (in Part III of Form 
NT). Three observations from Panel D are noteworthy. First, when all NT filers are considered 
together (regardless of whether management intends to file within the grace period or the reason 
for the delay), both NT 10-Qs and NT 10-Ks tend to have a significantly negative response.24 
Second, the significantly more negative response to NT 10-Qs than to NT 10-Ks documented in 
Panel A is concentrated among the accounting reasons. Third, companies citing multiple reasons 
for delay, perhaps not surprisingly, fared the worst, exhibiting –5.48 percent return for 10-Qs and 
–4.73 percent return for 10-Ks. 
In summary, Table 5 reports that investors react negatively to both NT 10-Q and NT 10-
K filings, but the reaction to NT 10-Q filings is significantly more negative. Furthermore, 
investors appear to consider the stated reason for the delay when reacting, as evidenced by a 
significantly stronger negative reaction to NT 10-Q filers compared to NT 10-K filers that cite 
accounting reasons for the delay. This last finding suggests that accounting problems signaled by 
management’s inability to file a timely quarterly report are likely to be significantly more serious 
than the accounting problems signaled by management’s inability to file a timely annual report.  
Table 6 further investigates our second research question by testing whether the reaction 
to NT filings is more negative for firms that fail to file within the grace period compared to firms 
that do not. The analysis in Panel A of Table 6 addresses this by examining the stock market 
reaction to late filers after partitioning jointly on whether management subsequently files the 
quarterly or annual financial statements within the SEC allowed grace period, and whether 
management declares their intention to file within the grace period or not. Management declares 
its intention to file within the grace period by checking the box in Part II (Part2_Check = 1) or 
                                                 
24 The only exception is NT 10-K filers citing corporate events as the reason for the delay. A closer examination 
reveals that this result follows because this subset consists predominantly of firms declaring they will file within the 
grace period (86 percent), and as the results in Table 6 below show they largely do so. 
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not (Part2_Check = 0). The top part of Panel A (Part2_Check = 0) reports the results for the 13 
percent ([139+143]/2,115) of the sample firms that do not explicitly declare that they intend to 
subsequently file their 10-Q or 10-K within the grace period. Interestingly, this analysis shows 
that 51 percent (143/[139+143]) of the NT filers that do not declare they will file within the 
grace period actually subsequently make the deadline. However, the top of Panel A also shows 
that investors react negatively to NT 10-Ks whether or not the firm subsequently files within the 
grace period, but insignificantly so if the 10-Qs are filed within the grace period. The top of 
Table 6, Panel A, also shows that the difference in the reaction across the two groups is 
significant for 10-Ks and the combined sample, but not for 10-Qs. Thus, in contrast to some of 
our analysis, Table 6 shows little evidence of a differential market response between the 10-Qs 
and the 10-Ks. However, the low statistical power of this test, due to small sample size, may 
partially explain these weak statistical results for the 10-Qs.  
The bottom part of Panel A of Table 6 (Part2_Check = 1) reports the results for the 87 
percent of our sample firms that declare on Part II of Form NT that they do intend to 
subsequently file within the grace period. Descriptively, this analysis shows that 36 percent 
(664/[664+1,169]) of the NT filers that declare they will file within the grace period 
subsequently fail to do so. However, the “failure rate” is 50 percent (446/[446+454]) for NT 10-
Qs and 23 percent (218/[218+715]) for NT 10-Ks. Thus, NT 10-Q filers are much more likely to 
overstate their expected ability to file within the SEC allowed grace period, perhaps because the 
grace period for late 10-Qs is shorter than the grace period for late 10-Ks. 
As with the top of Panel A, the results reported in the bottom of Panel A indicate that the 
stock market reacts negatively to both NT 10-Qs and 10-Ks whether or not the firm subsequently 
files within the grace period. However, unlike the top of Panel A, the reaction is significantly 
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more negative among the 664 NT 10-Q and NT 10-K filers that subsequently do not file within 
the grace period (–3.51 percent) compared to the 1,169 that do (–1.72 percent). This is 
interesting because the stock market reactions reported in Panel A are around the NT filing date, 
before the stock market knows when the late 10-Q or 10-K is ultimately filed. Thus, these results 
shed additional light on our findings in Panel C of Table 5 (discussed previously), which indicate 
a negative response in the subsample of late filers declaring their intention to file within the 
grace period. Specifically, the findings in Panel A of Table 6 are consistent with investors, on 
average, correctly anticipating which firms will subsequently fail to file their 10-Q or 10-K 
within the grace period, even when doing so is contrary to management’s declared intention. In 
other words, it suggests that investors do not blithely react to management’s declaration, but 
instead correctly infer, on average, when management will ultimately fail to comply with its 
“promise” to file within the grace period.  
Table 6, Panel B, further partitions the 87 percent of our sample that indicates they intend 
to file within the deadline by the reason for the delay.25 This analysis finds that there is generally 
a significantly negative reaction for all reasons for both NT 10-Qs and NT 10-Ks, except in 
partitions where the sample size is relatively small. The glaring exception is the accounting 
reason, which is the most popular reason and has a relatively large sample size in all cells. 
Specifically, when accounting reasons are cited for the delay, the market reaction is insignificant 
when the firm subsequently files within the grace period, but is significantly negative when the 
firm subsequently does not file within the grace period. This suggests that investors anticipate 
whether management will meet the grace period filing deadline and that accounting problems 
that result in relatively short delays do not signal problems that impact firm value, whereas 
                                                 
25 We do not further examine the 13 percent of our sample that do not declare they will file within the grace period 
because after partitioning on whether they actually filed within the deadline, Form type, and delay reason, the 
sample sizes become too small for reliable statistical inferences. 
24 
 
delays that result in missing the grace period deadline signal problems that impair value. Panel B 
also shows that the only significant difference between the reaction to NT filers that do and do 
not file within the grace period is for NT 10-Q filers that cite accounting reasons for the delay. 
This means that late filings caused by accounting reasons underlie the negative reaction to the 
NT 10-Q filers that indicate they will file on time (reported in the bottom of Panel A of Table 6).  
In summary, the results in Table 6 reveal a significantly larger negative stock price 
reaction to late filings for firms that subsequently fail to file within the grace period compared to 
firms that meet the deadline. Further, the results suggest that investors are able to anticipate in 
advance which firms will miss the grace period filing deadline, regardless of management’s 
declared intention on Form NT, and that this is driven by 10-Qs that cite accounting reasons for 
the delay. This finding is consistent with late 10-Qs being perceived by investors as signaling 
relatively worse news than late 10-Ks, and with accounting reasons for late filings being 
relatively more informative about management’s ability to file within the grace period. Table 6 
also provides evidence that investors do not react negatively to late filers that subsequently file 
within the grace period.26 
 
Late Filers’ Performance in the Year Following the Statutory Filing Deadline  
                                                 
26 We conduct two additional analyses to evaluate the effects of specific years. First, we examine the effect of year 
2004. Specifically, in 2004 there was a clustering of NT filings possibly related to changes in accounting-related 
regulations (i.e., the shorter filing deadline requirement and Section 404). Thus, we examine the extent to which the 
accounting-related results regarding NT filings for accounting reasons is driven by these filings. Specifically, we 
repeat the return analyses involving the by-reason breakdowns after excluding observations in 2004. We find similar 
inferences, consistent with the market’s reaction to NT filings for accounting reasons being less incomplete 
compared to other types of NT filings because of the nature of accounting reasons in general rather than the nature 
of filers in 2004. Second, we examine whether the result that investors appear to process accounting NT filings more 
fully than other types of NT filings could be a result the initial implementation of SOX, where the market may have 
been more aware of the nature of the associated accounting delays. Accordingly, we test whether the accounting NT 
filing results hold in a sample not including the SOX period by repeating our return analyses after excluding 
observations in 2004-2006 (the years in which SOX was initially implemented). We find that this exclusion 
generally results in higher magnitudes of negative returns to late filings during the non-2004-2006 years. This strong 
negative reaction to late filings during the non-SOX implementation period indicates that equity investors appear to 
be less harsh with firms that did not file timely during the SOX implementation period. 
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The analysis in Table 7 addresses our third research question, which asks whether the 
stock market reaction around the late filing is complete. We answer this question by examining 
the stock price behavior of late filers during the year following the late filing announcements. 
Evidence suggests that the market reaction to the release of accounting information is incomplete 
(e.g., Ball and Bartov 1996; Balakrishnan et al. 2010), and that behavioral biases are larger when 
uncertainty is greater (see, e.g., Daniel et al. 1998, 2001; Hirshleifer 2001). Because late filings 
are unusual and in many cases hard to interpret, they may create considerable price uncertainty 
and thus opportunities for potential mispricing. Table 7 reports the stock price performance of 
the sample firms over the 240 trading days following the NT filing, in four 60-trading-day 
intervals. Panel A reports the results by form type and indicates that the abnormal returns for 
both the NT 10-Q and 10-K filers remain significant during each of the first three 60-day 
windows but generally diminish over that period, then are insignificant in the fourth 60-day 
window. Thus, we find that investors do not fully incorporate the negative implications of the 
late filings around the filing date. Rather, stock prices for the late filers continue to decline for 
several months following the NT filing date, as well as for several months following the delayed 
10-Q or 10-K filing. This is consistent with the late filing not marking the end of the late filers’ 
problems. Interestingly, the delayed response (approximately 13 percent) is substantially higher 
than the immediate response of approximately 2.5 percent, reported in Table 5.27 One way to 
interpret this finding is that the initial NT release sugarcoats the true reason for the filing delay. 
This interpretation is consistent with the view in the accounting literature that management 
delays the release of bad news to investors (see, e.g., Kothari et al. 2009). 
Table 7, Panel B, further expands the analysis in Panel A in order to explore the reason 
                                                 
27 We obtain 13 percent by adding the subsequent abnormal returns in Panel A of Table 7 for both 10-Ks and 10-Qs 
across the first three windows (–4.93% + –4.61% + –3.75%), which are all statistically significant. We exclude the 
return in the fourth window (–0.61%) because it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
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for the late filing. This analysis indicates that, generally speaking, the drift tends to be less 
negative when accounting reasons are given. For example, in the first post-event period, [3, 62], 
the returns for uncertain, corporate events, and multiple subsamples are, respectively, 8.63 
percent, 7.30 percent, and 9.90 percent, whereas the returns for the accounting sample is 
markedly less negative, 1.11 percent, and statistically insignificant. These findings imply that 
the accounting reasons for a delay are more informative and allow investors to respond relatively 
more fully to the late filing news on the NT filing date. As in Panel A, for all four reasons, the 
abnormal returns become insignificant over the [183, 242] window. 
Table 7, Panels C and D, assess the drift over the period in which the drifts are found to 
be significant in Panels A and B, i.e., over the [3, 182] window; it also compares the magnitude 
of the drift for accounting versus non-accounting reasons. Panel C shows that, although there is a 
significant drift for accounting-based NTs, the magnitude of the drift for accounting-based NTs 
is smaller than that for NTs related to all other groups. Furthermore, Panel D provides a 
statistical test of the difference in the drift related to accounting reasons versus the drift related to 
non-accounting. The panel reveals that the post-NT-filing drift for non-accounting reasons is 
significantly larger than that for the accounting reasons. 
We conduct two additional analyses, which are untabulated for brevity. In the first 
analysis we validate the long-window return results by examining the immediate market 
response to the actual filing of the late quarterly or annual financial statements. This examination 
follows because short abnormal return windows attenuate or perhaps even eliminate the criticism 
of the “bad model” problem that may be leveled against long abnormal return windows (see, e.g., 
Brown and Warner 1985; Fama 1991). The analysis reports the abnormal returns in a five-day 
window around the actual filing dates, [–2, +2], where day zero is the actual filing date. This 
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analysis indicates that the return patterns observed for the long post-event windows also hold for 
the short windows around the actual filings. 
Specifically, the results show that the stock market response to the actual filing of the late 
10-Qs and 10-Ks is significantly negative (–1.17 percent). These results confirm the finding in 
Griffin (2003, p. 453) that investors respond negatively on the 10-K and 10-Q filing dates that 
follow an NT filing. In addition, the results show that this statistically significant negative return 
is observed only in the uncertain, corporate events, and multiple subsamples. By comparison, the 
return for the accounting subsample is much smaller and statistically insignificant. This 
consistency between the long- and short-window return results increases confidence that our 
long-window results are not due to mismeasured abnormal returns (the “bad model” problem). 
In the second analysis we investigate whether the negative stock price performance 
around the NT filing stems from the late filing conveying news about deeper problems within the 
firm or merely from the company missing an SEC filing deadline. Accordingly, we examine the 
ROA of NT filers during the five quarters surrounding the late filing (quarter 0). Three salient 
points emerge from our results. First, the results reveal that both quarterly and annual late filers 
have poor operating performance, as measured by ROA, during the five fiscal quarters centered 
on the NT filing quarter. This is consistent with the late NT filings signaling that past poor 
performance is expected to continue into the future rather than revert toward the mean as 
documented in prior research (e.g., Lipe and Kormendi 1994). This suggests that the negative 
market response to the NT filings is due to the NT filing conveying news about deeper 
underlying problems. Interestingly, although the NT filing can identify firms with persistently 
poor operating performance, the evidence on post-NT returns drift in Table 7 shows that the 
subsequent performance is worse than investors anticipated at the filing date; again, with one 
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exception—investors can anticipate the subsequent poor performance only when accounting 
reasons explain the delay. Second, during the late filing quarter, the operating performance of 
late quarterly filers is significantly more negative than that of late annual filers, which is again 
consistent with the stock return results. Third, our results indicate that ROA for the NT filers 
citing non-accounting reasons is more negative than ROA for the NT filers citing accounting 
reasons in every window. This pattern in ROA is consistent with the larger long-term negative 
returns when non-accounting reasons explain the delay, as observed in Panel B of Table 7. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We investigate and contrast the immediate and future capital market consequences of 
announcements of late quarterly and annual filings. We address our research questions by 
examining short-window stock price changes around NT filing dates, long-window stock price 
changes following NT filing dates, and operating performance around the NT filing quarter. The 
findings can be summarized as follows. 
The stock market reaction tests demonstrate a negative market response to late filing 
announcements for both quarterly and annual reports. This analysis also finds evidence 
suggesting that market participants “see through” management assertions that they will file 
within the SEC’s allowed grace period when they subsequently fail to do so. A comparison of 
quarterly and annual late filers finds a stronger negative reaction to late quarterly filing 
announcements than to late annual filing announcements, especially when accounting reasons 
explain the delay. This finding suggests that accounting problems are perceived by investors to 
signal deeper problems when they delay quarterly filings than when they delay annual filings, 
perhaps because quarterly filings are unaudited and less costly/burdensome to prepare (e.g., 
require significantly less disclosure). An analysis of future performance finds that abnormal 
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returns continue to decline during the months following late filing announcements, and that the 
decline is less pronounced when accounting reasons explain the delay. 
Viewed as a whole, this paper contributes to capital markets research by providing theory 
and evidence focusing on situations when accounting financial statements are not filed within 
SEC’s regulatory deadlines. Among other new insights to the literature, this paper documents 
that (a) delayed quarterly filings have distinctly different valuation implications than delayed 
annual filings, (b) investors do not naively accept managements’ delay-related assertions at face 
value, (c) accounting problems play a unique role in communicating the seriousness of the delay, 
and (d) delay announcements tend to be followed by continued poor operating performance. 
In line with recent calls to increase the usefulness of accounting research (e.g., Merchant 
2012; Konchitchki and Patatoukas 2014), the analyses and evidence in this paper also offer a 
communication channel between professionals and practitioners, including advice to chief 
financial officers (CFOs) and other parties involved in the filing of financial statements. For 
example, the evidence that investors are able to ‘see through’ management’s incorrect assertions 
suggests that investors in this setting are relatively sophisticated in mapping financial 
information into stock prices. These findings have implications for late filers because they 
question the wisdom of management’s disclosing incorrectly the expected filing date of quarterly 
and annual financial statements. As another example, this paper demonstrates the substantial 
negative effect on shareholders’ value when financial statements are not filed in a timely manner, 
and especially when filing delays stem from accounting problems. This evidence highlights, for 
CFOs and others involved in the financial reporting process, the significant importance of being 
attuned to filing financial statements on time and being especially cautious when accounting 
problems emerge.  
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
  
          Total 10-Q 10-K  
 
Total number of NT 10-Q and NT 10-K filings in Audit Analytics—
Non-Timely Module Feed (NT) dataset, with fiscal period end between 
2000 and 2008, non-missing date and reason for the late filing, non-
duplicate observations, and NT filing on or before September 1, 2009 (to 
allow future return data over 2010)  49,233 30,920 18,313
     
 Delete:    
  
Observations without available and 
consistent data from Compustat, CRSP, 
Audit Analytics, and EDGAR financial 
statements filing and fiscal period end- 
date data required for the analyses  (41,932) (26,857) (15,075)
    7,301 4,063 3,238
     
  
Non-first-time NT filings in the Audit 
Analytics database  (4,656) (2,793) (1,863)
     2,645 1,270 1,375
     
  
Firms with stock price lower than $1, 
market value of equity lower than $10 
million, or missing [–2, +2] abnormal 
return  (509) (206) (303)
     2,136 1,064 1,072
     
  
Deletions related to reclassification into 
four reason groups (including deletion of 
technical late filings)  (21) (16) (5)
     
 Final sample for the analyses  2,115 1,048 1,067
        
  The table provides the sample selection for the sample used in the analyses. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
 Panel A: Form NT Filings Sample and Variables Used in the Analyses 
 Variable Variable Definition   Mean Med StdDev 25 Pc. 75 Pc. N 
 DelayDays # calendar days from 10-Q / 10-K 
statutory filing deadline to actual filing 
of 10-Q / 10-K 
10-Q 28.75 6.00 76.30 4.00 8.00 1,048
 10-K 28.48 15.00 62.99 9.00 16.00 1,067
 Total 28.61 8.00 69.88 5.00 15.00 2,115
 DaysFiscalEndTo 
FSFiling 
# calendar days from fiscal period end 
to actual filing of 10-Q / 10-K 
10-Q 71.90 50.00 75.67 46.00 52.00 1,048
 10-K 109.90 94.00 62.72 89.00 106.00 1,067
 Total 91.07 83.00 71.97 50.00 104.00 2,115
         
 
Part2_Check Management declaration of whether it 
intends (=1; box in Part2 of NT form is 
checked) or it does not intend (=0; box 
in Part II of NT form is unchecked) to 
file within grace period 
 0.87 1.00 0.34 1.00 1.00 2,115
 
LOSS =1 if income before extraordinary items 
is negative; =0 otherwise 
 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 2,070
 LOSSINTENSITY Sum of LOSS over past five quarters  1.70 1.00 1.79 0.00 3.00 2,054
 PastSixMnthRet Raw return over past six months  -0.03 -0.06 0.50 -0.30 0.15 2,036
 CFO Cash flows from operations, $MM  54.15 3.10 599.31 -4.32 24.21 2,011
 
SHARP_CFO_ 
DECLINE 
=1 if CFO drops by more than 30% 
during the period; =0 otherwise 
 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 1,986
 TotalAssets Total assets, $MM  2,324 277 20,880 85 930 2,078
 NYSEdum =1 if listed in NYSE; =0 otherwise  0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 2,078
 NASDAQdum =1 if listed in NASDAQ; =0 otherwise  0.48 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 2,078
 
BIG4AUDITOR =1 if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 
4; =0 otherwise 
 0.68 1.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 1,507
 
ACCELERATED =1 if an accelerated/large accelerated 
filer; =0 otherwise 
 0.53 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 2,115
 MVE Market value of equity, $MM  1,067 183 5,225 63 617 2,075
 BTM Book-to-market  0.75 0.55 0.81 0.30 0.91 2,074
 MVE_CHANGE Period change in MVE  0.00 -0.03 0.34 -0.19 0.11 2,052
 
FormType10-K dum =1 if the NT filing is related to 10-K; =0 
otherwise 
  0.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 2,115
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Table 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel B: Distribution by Year, NT Form Type, and Reason for Delay  
     NT Form Type Reason Group 
 Year   Total   10-Q 10-K  Uncertain Accounting Corporate Events Multiple
 2000  425  255 170 181 65 111 68 
 2001  189  95 94 57 60 42 30 
 2002  175  92 83 41 95 23 16 
 2003  165  79 86 47 78 19 21 
 2004  378  122 256 45 261 26 46 
 2005  313  153 160 60 196 29 28 
 2006  233  132 101 28 162 16 27 
 2007  137  74 63 35 72 16 14 
 2008  100  46 54 27 40 20 13 
 Total  2,115  1,048 1,067 521 1,029 302 263 
 10-Q      298 474 178 98 
 10-K            223 555 124 165 
           
 Panel C: Distribution by Stock Exchange 
     N %     
 American Stock Exchange 92 4.4%     
 New York Stock Exchange 445 21.4%     
 NASDAQ 990 47.6%     
 Over-the-Counter 531 25.6%     
 Other 20 1.0%     
  2,078 100.0%     
 Missing data 37      
 Total 2,115            
           
 
Panel D: Distribution by Form Type and Management Declaration to File within Grace Period and Whether Filed 
within Grace Period 
     Filed within grace period?    
 
Management declared will file within 
grace period? (Part2_Check)    NO YES  Total    
     NT 10-Q Filings    
 NO    88 60 148    
 YES    446 454 900    
 Total    534 514 1,048    
     NT 10-K Filings    
 NO    51 83 134    
 YES    218 715 933    
 Total       269 798  1,067    
 
The table provides descriptive statistics and variable definitions for the NT filing sample used in the paper. The late
filing delay (DelayDays), is the number of calendar days between the 10-Q or 10-K financial statement filing date
and the estimated statutory deadline. We retrieve the fiscal quarter/yearend and the actual filing dates directly from
EDGAR. Uncertain, Accounting, Corporate, and Multiple reason groups are based on the reason for the late filing,
as classified using management’s statement on the NT form. Table 1 describes the sample.  
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Table 3 
NT Form Filers and Compustat Population Distribution across Industries, by Form Type 
  
  Compustat Population Form NT Filers 
    Form Type   Form Type 
  Total  10-Q 10-K Total  10-Q 10-K 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
 Chemicals 4,756 2.0% 3,825 2.0% 931 2.0% 36 1.7% 17 1.6% 19 1.8% 
 Computers 34,251 14.4% 27,600 14.4% 6,651 14.4% 355 16.8% 182 17.4% 173 16.2%
 Durable Goods 44,102 18.5% 35,502 18.5% 8,600 18.6% 423 20.0% 199 19.0% 224 21.0%
 Extractive industries 7,271 3.1% 5,844 3.0% 1,427 3.1% 43 2.0% 18 1.7% 25 2.3% 
 Financial institutions 41,541 17.4% 33,377 17.4% 8,164 17.7% 265 12.5% 145 13.8% 120 11.2%
 Food 4,430 1.9% 3,562 1.9% 868 1.9% 31 1.5% 21 2.0% 10 0.9% 
 Insurance and real estate 12,685 5.3% 10,230 5.3% 2,455 5.3% 114 5.4% 56 5.3% 58 5.4% 
 Mining and construction 3,704 1.6% 3,000 1.6% 704 1.5% 34 1.6% 21 2.0% 13 1.2% 
 Other 2,003 0.8% 1,681 0.9% 322 0.7% 27 1.3% 16 1.5% 11 1.0% 
 Pharmaceuticals 14,338 6.0% 11,723 6.1% 2,615 5.7% 107 5.1% 57 5.4% 50 4.7% 
 Retail 21,251 8.9% 17,109 8.9% 4,142 9.0% 225 10.6% 99 9.4% 126 11.8%
 Services 20,422 8.6% 16,449 8.6% 3,973 8.6% 199 9.4% 99 9.4% 100 9.4% 
 Textiles, printing, publishing 8,589 3.6% 6,924 3.6% 1,665 3.6% 73 3.5% 33 3.1% 40 3.7% 
 Transportation 12,035 5.1% 9,704 5.1% 2,331 5.0% 126 6.0% 62 5.9% 64 6.0% 
 Utilities 6,831 2.9% 5,489 2.9% 1,342 2.9% 57 2.7% 23 2.2% 34 3.2% 
     Total 238,209 100%  192,019 100% 46,190 100% 2,115 100% 1,048 100% 1,067 100%
  
The table provides distribution by industry and by form type (10-Q and 10-K) of the Compustat and NT form filer samples. The Compustat 
Population sample includes all non-duplicate observations in the Compustat North America, Annual and Quarterly Fundamentals datasets (XPF 
Tables, quarterly updates) with available CRSP data over the NT Filers sample period. The Form NT Filers sample is following Table 1.  
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Table 4 
Mean and Median Number of Delay Days (DelayDays) by NT Form Type and Reason for Delay 
  
 Panel A: DelayDays by Form Type and Management Declaration to File within Grace Period 
      Part2_Check = 0 Part2_Check = 1  Diff (0–1) 
          N Mean Median  N Mean Median   Mean Median 
             p-value p-value 
  10-Q and 10-K   282 50.97 13.50 1,833 25.17 8.00  <0.0001 0.0008 
               
  10-Q    148 46.22 7.00 900 25.88 5.00  0.0064 0.0171 
  10-K    134 56.22 15.00 933 24.50 15.00  <0.0001 0.0733 
  Diff (Q-K)     –9.99 –8.00  1.38 –10.00    
   p-value          0.3640 <0.0001    0.6513 <0.0001       
               
 Panel B: DelayDays by Form Type, Reason for Delay, and Management Declaration to File within Grace Period 
   All NT Filers Part2_Check = 0 Part2_Check = 1  Diff (0–1) 
   N Mean Median  N Mean Median  N Mean Median   Mean Median 
 Reason group:           p-value p-value 
 
U
nc
er
ta
in
 10-Q and 10-K 521 10.92 5.00 53 26.51 4.00 468 9.16 5.00  0.0004 0.2034 
 10-Q 298 7.18 4.00 30 17.77 3.50 268 6.00 5.00  0.0013 0.2599 
 10-K 223 15.91 12.00 23 37.91 4.00 200 13.39 12.00  0.0176 0.8418 
 Diff (Q-K)  –8.73 –8.00  –20.15 –0.50  –7.39 –7.00    
 p-value  0.0095 <.0001  0.4630 0.7918  <0.0001 <0.0001    
               
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 10-Q and 10-K 1,029 41.45 14.00 151 69.97 15.00 878 36.55 14.00  0.0001 0.0046 
 10-Q 474 47.33 6.00 76 71.04 12.50 398 42.80 6.00  0.0208 <0.0001 
 10-K 555 36.44 15.00 75 68.88 15.00 480 31.37 15.00  <0.0001 0.0254 
 Diff (Q-K)  10.89 –9.00  2.16 –2.50  11.43 –9.00    
 p-value  0.0482 <0.0001  0.8949 0.2050  0.0420 <0.0001    
               
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 
Ev
en
ts
 
10-Q and 10-K 302 13.08 7.00 48 12.67 5.00 254 13.16 7.00  0.8967 0.1808 
 10-Q 178 11.47 5.00 31 11.48 5.00 147 11.46 6.00  0.9970 0.1086 
 10-K 124 15.40 15.00 17 14.82 14.00 107 15.49 15.00  0.8868 0.3628 
 Diff (Q-K)  –3.93 –10.00  –3.34 –9.00  –4.02 –9.00    
 p-value  0.2915 <0.0001  0.5866 0.0299  0.3560 <0.0001    
               
 
M
ul
tip
le
 10-Q and 10-K 263 31.26 14.00 30 59.87 14.00 233 27.58 13.00  0.1042 0.3319 
 10-Q 98 35.88 6.00 11 50.27 7.00 87 34.06 6.00  0.6969 0.2393 
 10-K 165 28.52 15.00 19 65.42 48.00 146 23.72 15.00  0.0536 0.1999 
 Diff (Q-K)  7.36 –9.00  –15.15 –41.00  10.34 –9.00    
 p-value   0.4567 <0.0001    0.7059 0.0060    0.2843 <0.0001    
  
The table provides analysis of delay days by NT form type, i.e., NT 10-Q and NT 10-K, and the reason for the delay. The late filing 
delay (DelayDays) is the number of calendar days between the 10-Q or 10-K financial statements filing date and the estimated 
statutory deadline. We retrieve the fiscal quarter/yearend date and the actual filing date of the corresponding financial statements 
directly from EDGAR. Part2_Check refers to management’s declaration of whether it intends (=1; box in Part2 of NT form is 
checked) or it does not intend (=0; box in Part II of NT form is unchecked) to file its financial statements within the grace period,
which is five days for 10-Q and 15 days for 10-K. Sample is described in Table 1.  
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Table 5 
Abnormal Stock Returns around Form NT Filing by Form Type and Reason for Delay. 
Fama-French-Momentum Adjusted Returns. Window = [–2, +2] 
  
 Panel A: Abnormal Return by Form Type 
   All NT Filers         
   N % p-value         
  10-Q and 10-K 2,115 –2.44 <0.0001         
              
  10-Q 1,048 –2.93 <0.0001         
  10-K 1,067 –1.96 <0.0001         
  Diff (Q–K)  –0.97          
   p-value   0.0527                      
              
 Panel B: Abnormal Return by Form Type, Subsample Partitioned by Alford et al. (1994)’s Calendar Delay Days 
      0 < DelayDays ≤ 5 5 < DelayDays ≤ 17  
          N % p-value N % p-value    
  10-Q and 10-K    661 –1.83 0.0002 1,015 –2.70 <0.0001   
              
  10-Q    488 –2.00 0.0010 355 –4.28 <0.0001   
   10-K        173 –1.37 0.0575  660 –1.86 0.0017      
              
 Panel C: Abnormal Return by Form Type and Management Declaration to File within Grace Period 
       Part2_Check = 0 Part2_Check = 1 Diff (0–1) 
          N % p-value  N % p-value  % p-value 
  10-Q and 10-K    282 –2.89 <0.0001 1,833 –2.37 <0.0001 –0.52 0.4542 
              
  10-Q    148 –2.09 0.0073 900 –3.06 <0.0001 0.98 0.2790 
  10-K    134 –3.77 0.0002 933 –1.69 0.0004 –2.08 0.0549 
  Diff (Q–K)     1.68   –1.37    
   p-value          0.1736      0.0400        
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Table 5 (continued) 
Abnormal Stock Returns around Form NT Filing by Form Type and Reason for Delay. 
Fama-French-Momentum Adjusted Returns. Window = [–2, +2] 
 Panel D: Abnormal Return by Form Type, Reason for Delay, and Management Declaration to File within Grace Period 
   All NT Filers Part2_Check = 0 Part2_Check = 1 Diff (0–1) 
   N % p-value  N % p-value  N % p-value  % p-value 
 Reason group:            
 
U
nc
er
ta
in
 10-Q and 10-K 521 –2.36 0.0002 53 –2.84 0.1341 468 –2.31 0.0007 –0.53 0.8006 
 10-Q 298 –2.27 0.0068 30 –1.08 0.5745 268 –2.41 0.0081 1.32 0.5347 
 10-K 223 –2.48 0.0122 23 –5.12 0.1572 200 –2.17 0.0341 –2.95 0.3610 
 Diff (Q–K)  0.20   4.04   –0.24    
 p-value  0.8749   0.3179   0.8632    
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 10-Q and 10-K 1,029 –1.89 <0.0001 151 –2.53 0.0005 878 –1.78 <0.0001 –0.74 0.3667 
 10-Q 474 –2.83 <0.0001 76 –2.50 0.0059 398 –2.89 <0.0001 0.39 0.7177 
 10-K 555 –1.09 0.0352 75 –2.55 0.0250 480 –0.86 0.1313 –1.68 0.1814 
 Diff (Q–K)  –1.74   0.04   –2.03    
 p-value  0.0193   0.9760   0.0154    
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 E
ve
nt
s 
10-Q and 10-K 302 –2.18 0.0162 48 –2.65 0.0368 254 –2.09 0.0469 –0.57 0.7274 
 10-Q 178 –2.87 0.0150 31 –0.89 0.5585 147 –3.29 0.0184 2.39 0.2445 
 10-K 124 –1.19 0.4034 17 –5.87 0.0088 107 –0.44 0.7825 –5.42 0.0385 
 Diff (Q–K)  –1.68   4.97   –2.84    
 p-value  0.3590   0.0531   0.1801    
 
M
ul
tip
le
 10-Q and 10-K 263 –5.01 <0.0001 30 –5.18 0.0424 233 –4.99 <0.0001 –0.20 0.9521 
 10-Q 98 –5.48 0.0006 11 –5.32 0.3246 87 –5.50 0.0011 0.18 0.9708 
 10-K 165 –4.73 0.0007 19 –5.10 0.0638 146 –4.68 0.0023 –0.42 0.8888 
 Diff (Q–K)  –0.75   –0.21   –0.82    
 p-value   0.7271      0.9674    0.7139    
  
The table presents abnormal event returns surrounding the filing of NT form. Panel A presents the event returns for the entire 
sample and by NT form type. Panel B provides the event returns for two subgroups following Alford et al. (1994), where the filing
delay (DelayDays) is the number of calendar days between the 10-Q or 10-K financial statements filing date and the estimated 
statutory deadline. Panel C further partitions the full NT filers sample event returns by Part2_Check and the reason for the delay. 
Abnormal returns, Πt=1,n(1 + Ri,t) – Πt=1,n(1 + E(Ri,t)), are calculated using the CRSP Daily Stock File as the buy-and-hold returns 
for firm i over the n trading days in the window (window is from day –2 through day +2, where day 0 is the NT filing date), where 
Π is the product operator; Ri,t is firm i’s daily return on day t, inclusive of dividends and other distributions; and E(Ri,t) is firm i’s 
expected return on day t. Expected returns, E(Ri,t), are measured using the three Fama and French (1993) factors, MKTRF, SMB, 
and HML, augmented by a momentum factor, UMD, following Carhart (1997). Specifically, we first estimate a model using a 40-
trading-day hold-out period which begins 55 trading days prior to obtain four betas, and then compute the expected return for firm 
i on day t, as Rf,t plus the product of the estimated betas and the related factors. Part2_Check refers to management’s declaration of 
whether it intends (=1; box in Part2 of NT form is checked) or it does not intend (=0; box in Part II of NT form is unchecked) to 
file its financial statements within the grace period, which is five days for 10-Q and 15 days for 10-K. The reason groups for the 
delay, Uncertain, Accounting, Corporate Events, and Multiple, are based on the reason for the late filing as classified using
management’s statement on the NT form. Risk-free rate and Fama-French and Momentum factors are from the Fama-French 
dataset. Stock returns are adjusted for delisting returns. Sample is described in Table 1.  
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Table 6 
Abnormal Stock Returns around Form NT Filing by Form Type, Management Declaration to File 
within Grace Period, Whether Filed within Grace Period, and Reason for Delay. 
Fama-French-Momentum Adjusted Returns. Window = [–2, +2] 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Return by Form Type, Management Declaration to File within Grace Period, and Whether Filed within 
Grace Period  
   File after Grace Period File within 5/15 Days  Diff  
   N % p-value  N % p-value   % p-value  
 
Pa
rt
2_
Ch
ec
k 
= 
0 10-Q and 10-K 139 –4.05 <0.0001 143 –1.76 0.0381  –2.30 0.0607  
 10-Q 88 –2.93 0.0077 60 –0.86 0.4152  –2.07 0.1684  
 10-K 51 –5.99 0.0002 83 –2.41 0.0545  –3.59 0.0697  
 Diff (Q–K)  3.07   1.55      
 p-value   0.1026      0.3632          
                         
 
Pa
rt
2_
Ch
ec
k 
= 
1 10-Q and 10-K 664 –3.51 <0.0001 1,169 –1.72 <0.0001  –1.80 0.0095  
 10-Q 446 –4.12 <0.0001 454 –2.02 0.0016  –2.10 0.0246  
 10-K 218 –2.26 0.0224 715 –1.52 0.0051  –0.74 0.5095  
 Diff (Q–K)  –1.86   –0.50      
 p-value   0.1205      0.5551          
 
 Panel B: For Part2_Check = 1 only, Abnormal Return by Form Type, Delay Reason, and Whether Filed within Grace Period 
   File after Grace Period File within 5/15 Days  Diff  
   N % p-value  N % p-value   % p-value  
 Reason group:           
 
U
nc
er
ta
in
 10-Q and 10-K 128 –3.44 0.0230 340 –1.88 0.0115  –1.57 0.3485  
 10-Q 97 –3.72 0.0480 171 –1.66 0.0802  –2.07 0.3231  
 10-K 31 –2.57 0.2346 169 –2.10 0.0679  –0.47 0.8675  
 Diff (Q–K)  –1.16   0.44      
 p-value  0.7421   0.7664      
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 10-Q and 10-K 355 –3.69 <0.0001 523 –0.49 0.3242  –3.21 0.0002  
 10-Q 223 –4.75 <0.0001 175 –0.53 0.4832  –4.22 0.0003  
 10-K 132 –1.92 0.1189 348 –0.47 0.4660  –1.45 0.2939  
 Diff (Q–K)  –2.83   –0.06      
 p-value  0.0613   0.9493      
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 
Ev
en
ts
 
10-Q and 10-K 96 –0.47 0.7560 158 –3.07 0.0309  2.61 0.2070  
 10-Q 76 –1.49 0.3794 71 –5.21 0.0206  3.71 0.1824  
 10-K 20 3.43 0.2984 87 –1.33 0.4660  4.76 0.2482  
 Diff (Q–K)  –4.92   –3.87      
 p-value  0.1843   0.1728      
 
M
ul
tip
le
 10-Q and 10-K 85 –6.30 0.0001 148 –4.23 0.0072  –2.07 0.3341  
 10-Q 50 –6.13 0.0001 37 –4.65 0.1764  –1.48 0.6866  
 10-K 35 –6.55 0.0354 111 –4.10 0.0210  –2.45 0.4893  
 Diff (Q–K)  0.42   –0.55      
 p-value  0.8990   0.8781      
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The table presents abnormal event returns surrounding the filing of NT form, by actual filing, management’s expectation to 
file within the grace period, form type, and the reason for the delay. Abnormal returns, Πt=1,n(1 + Ri,t) – Πt=1,n(1 + E(Ri,t)), are 
calculated using the CRSP Daily Stock File as the buy-and-hold returns for firm i over the n trading days in the window 
(window is from day –2 through day +2, where day 0 is the NT filing date), where Π is the product operator; Ri,t is firm i’s 
daily return on day t, inclusive of dividends and other distributions; and E(Ri,t) is firm i’s expected return on day t. Expected 
returns, E(Ri,t), are measured using the three Fama and French (1993) factors, MKTRF, SMB, and HML, augmented by a
momentum factor, UMD, following Carhart (1997). Specifically, we first estimate a model using a 40-trading-day hold-out 
period which begins 55 trading days prior to obtain four betas, and then compute the expected return for firm i on day t, as Rf,t
plus the product of the estimated betas and the related factors. MKTRFt is the daily excess return on a value-weighted 
aggregate equity market portfolio, SMBt is the return on a zero-investment factor mimicking portfolio for size (market value
of equity), HMLt is the return on a zero-investment factor mimicking portfolio for book-to-market value of equity, and UMDt
is the return on a zero-investment factor mimicking portfolio for momentum. Part2_Check refers to management’s 
declaration of whether it intends (=1; box in Part2 of NT form is checked) or it does not intend (=0; box in Part II of NT form 
is unchecked) to file its financial statements within the grace period, which is five days for 10-Q and 15 days for 10-K. File 
Late (file within 5/15 Days) refers to whether the financial statements are filed after (within) the grace period of five and 15 
days for 10-Q and 10-K, respectively. The reason groups for the delay, Uncertain, Accounting, Corporate Events, and
Multiple, are based on the reason for the late filing as classified by management’s statement on the NT form. We obtain the 
risk-free rate and the Fama-French and Momentum factors from the Fama-French dataset. Stock returns are adjusted for the 
effect of delisting returns. Sample is described in Table 1. 
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Table 7 
Post Form NT Filing Drift by Form NT Type and Reason for Delay. Fama-French-Momentum Adjusted Returns 
  
 Panel A: Drift by Form NT Type  
   Window = [3, 62] Window = [63, 122] Window = [123, 182] Window = [183, 242]  
  Both 10-Q 10-K Diff  Both 10-Q 10-K Diff Both 10-Q 10-K Diff Both 10-Q 10-K Diff  
 % –4.93 –4.96 –4.89 –0.07 –4.61 –4.93 –4.29 –0.64 –3.75 –4.01 –3.49 –0.51 –0.61 –1.20 –0.04 –1.16  
 p <0.0001 0.0001 0.0025 0.9724 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0011 0.7177 0.0002 0.0014 0.0240 0.7974 0.5174 0.3469 0.9795 0.5365  
 N 2,100  1,039  1,061   2,010  993  1,017   1,915  943  972   1,832  903  929    
                   
 Panel B: Drift by Form Type and Reason for Delay   
   Window = [3, 62] Window = [63, 122] Window = [123, 182] Window = [183, 242]  
  Both 10-Q 10-K Diff  Both 10-Q 10-K Diff  Both 10-Q 10-K Diff  Both 10-Q 10-K Diff  
 
U
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
 % –8.63 –7.34 –10.35 3.01 –3.43 –4.70 –1.78 –2.92 –5.42 –4.17 –7.04 2.87 –1.25 –0.80 –1.82 1.02  
 p 0.0003 0.0050 0.0156 0.5457 0.0857 0.0699 0.5692 0.4719 0.0391 0.1340 0.1469 0.5877 0.5712 0.7804 0.5932 0.8195  
 N 518  296 222  495  280 215  471  267 204  452  256 196   
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
                  
 % –1.11 –0.98 –1.22 0.24 –2.59 –2.91 –2.31 –0.60 –2.27 –1.69 –2.77 1.08 –1.01 –1.61 –0.50 –1.11  
 p 0.3608 0.5836 0.4613 0.9219 0.0088 0.0290 0.1083 0.7599 0.0276 0.2558 0.0528 0.6020 0.3893 0.3101 0.7688 0.6345  
 N 1,025  472 553  1,002  465 537  964  446 518  930  428 502   
                   
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
E
v
e
n
t
s
 % –7.30 –8.62 –5.45 –3.18 –9.51 –11.53 –6.65 –4.89 –6.48 –9.92 –1.68 –8.25 1.97 –1.27 6.74 –8.02  
 p 0.0056 0.0123 0.1863 0.5508 0.0022 0.0048 0.1640 0.4341 0.0287 0.0049 0.7432 0.1675 0.4457 0.7021 0.1009 0.1278  
 N 298  174 124  270  158 112  256  149 107  237  141 96   
                    
 
M
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
 % –9.90 –10.53 –9.53 –1.00 –9.86 –4.49 –13.03 8.54 –3.45 –5.30 –2.40 –2.90 –0.37 –0.10 –0.53 0.43  
 p 0.0125 0.0019 0.1134 0.8838 0.0013 0.2219 0.0030 0.1320 0.3054 0.2256 0.6070 0.6494 0.9028 0.9814 0.8990 0.9413  
 N 259  97 162    243  90 153    224  81 143  213  78 135   
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Table 7 (continued) 
Post Form NT Filing Drift by Form NT Type and Reason for Delay. Fama-French-Momentum 
Panel C: Drift Over Period Where We Found Significant Returns (i.e., [3, 182]), for the Following Groups: All, by 
Reason, and Non-Accounting Only 
Window = [3, 182] 
Both 10-Q 10-K Diff 
A
ll 
% –10.34 –11.30 –9.41 –1.89 
p <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0004 0.6039 
N 1,914  942  972    
U
nc
er
ta
in
 
% –13.52 –13.92 –13.01 –0.90 
p 0.0023 0.0136 0.0681 0.9204 
N 470  266  204  
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
% –4.47 –4.28 –4.64 0.36 
p 0.0256 0.1469 0.0899 0.9281 
N 964  446  518  
C
or
po
ra
te
 
Ev
en
ts
 % –21.05 –27.15 –12.57 –14.58 
p 0.0003 0.0006 0.1498 0.2162 
N 256  149  107  
 
M
ul
tip
le
 % –16.65 –12.23 –19.16 6.93 
p 0.0075 0.1028 0.0297 0.5455 
N 224  81  143    
 
N
on
-
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
O
nl
y 
% –16.29 –17.62 –14.84 –2.77 
p <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0016 0.6523 
N 950  496  454    
 
Panel D: Comparing Drift Over [3, 182] for Accounting Versus Non-Accounting Reasons 
 Window = [3, 182] 
 Both 10-Q 10-K 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g % –4.47 –4.28 –4.64 
p 0.0256 0.1469 0.0899 
N 964  446  518    
N
on
-
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g % –16.29 –17.62 –14.84 
p <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0016 
N 950  496  454    
Accounting Minus Non-Accounting 
 Both 10-Q 10-K 
 % 11.82 13.34 10.21 
  p 0.0012 0.0085 0.0524             
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The table presents post-NT-filing drift abnormal returns, accumulated over the period after the filing of NT form. Panel A 
presents the abnormal returns over four post-NT filing periods for the entire sample, with abnormal data available and by NT 
form type. Panel B further breaks the post-NT filing abnormal returns by the reason for the delay. Panels C and D report 
abnormal returns for a summary window where significant drifts are observed, i.e., over the [3, 182] window, including testing 
the drift for accounting versus non-accounting reasons. Abnormal returns, Πt=1,n(1 + Ri,t) – Πt=1,n(1 + E(Ri,t)), are calculated 
using the CRSP Daily Stock File as the buy-and-hold returns for firm i over the n trading days in the window (window is from 
day X through day Y, where day 0 is the NT filing date), where Π is the product operator; Ri,t is firm i’s daily return on day t, 
inclusive of dividends and other distributions; and E(Ri,t) is firm i’s expected return on day t. Expected returns, E(Ri,t), are 
measured using the three Fama and French (1993) factors, MKTRF, SMB, and HML, augmented by a momentum factor,
UMD, following Carhart (1997). Specifically, we first estimate a model using a 40-trading-day hold-out period which begins 55 
trading days prior to obtain four betas, and then compute the expected return for firm i on day t, as Rf,t plus the product of the 
estimated betas and the related factors. MKTRFt is the daily excess return on a value-weighted aggregate equity market 
portfolio, SMBt is the return on a zero-investment factor mimicking portfolio for size (market value of equity), HMLt is the 
return on a zero-investment factor mimicking portfolio for book-to-market value of equity, and UMDt is the return on a zero-
investment factor mimicking portfolio for momentum. Part2_Check refers to management’s declaration of whether it intends 
(=1; box in Part2 of NT form is checked) or it does not intend (=0; box in Part II of NT form is unchecked) to file its financial 
statements within the grace period, which is five days for 10-Q and 15 days for 10-K. The reason groups for the delay, 
Uncertain, Accounting, Corporate Events, and Multiple, are based on the reason for the late filing as classified by
management’s statement on the NT form. We obtain the risk-free rate and the Fama-French and Momentum factors from the 
Fama-French dataset. Stock returns are adjusted for the effect of delisting returns. Sample is described in Table 1.  
 
